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This study extends the literature on symbolic management by incorporating the role of stakeholder perceptions into thecontext of corporate philanthropy. In particular, we differentiate between the quantitative (generous giving) and qualitative
(innovative giving) aspects of giving. We argue that although stakeholders may perceive both types of giving as being
substantive rather than symbolic, innovative giving is likely to be perceived as more substantive than generous giving is and,
thus, has a greater impact on firm value. Furthermore, stakeholder perceptions of corporate philanthropy as being more
symbolic or substantive are influenced by firm characteristics—the type of products or services that a firm provides and
the life-cycle stage that the firm is in—which provide stakeholders with a context to better assess the nature of a firm’s
philanthropic actions and the substantiveness of its giving. We find support for our predictions using a sample covering U.S.
firms’ philanthropic activities over a 19-year period.
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Introduction
Whether firms should allocate resources to philanthropic
activities remains an intensively debated issue both among
practitioners and in academic research (e.g., Brammer
and Millington 2005, Freeman 1984, Margolis and Walsh
2003). According to the traditional view of business
corporations, firms exist solely to maximize economic
efficiency (Bremmer 1987, Friedman 1970). In this view,
corporate philanthropy diverts valuable firm resources
away from a firm’s business operations, thereby reducing
shareholder wealth. However, the growing influence of
business firms in many aspects of social and political life
in recent years has led to an increasing interest in both
the economic and social consequences of their actions
(Paine 2002, Rosen et al. 2003). As a result, the public
has increasing expectations for business firms to engage
in philanthropic activities (Marquis et al. 2007).
One potential resolution for this ongoing debate is to
understand whether corporate philanthropy enhances firm
financial performance. If doing good also enables firms to
do well economically, then we have a convergence of the
normative and instrumental views of corporate philan-
thropy. This has led to academic studies that systematically
examine the relationship between corporate philanthropy
and firm financial performance. Although exceptions exist,
reviews of empirical studies on this topic generally reveal
a positive relationship between corporate philanthropy
and firm financial performance (e.g., Wang and Qian
2011, Wokutch and Spencer 1987). These findings are
consistent with the argument that philanthropy positively
affects financial performance through its influence on
stakeholder relations (Berman et al. 1999, Wang et al.
2008). How stakeholders perceive and attribute corporate
philanthropic activities has been argued to be the key
mechanism through which firms can gain positive returns
from corporate philanthropy.
However, when examining the relationship between
corporate philanthropy and corporate financial perfor-
mance, most previous studies have not distinguished
among different types of corporate philanthropic programs
or incorporated the characteristics of firms pursuing phil-
anthropic activities. More specifically, most of the existing
literature has not considered differential stakeholder per-
ceptions and has assumed implicitly that stakeholders
do not discriminate among the merits and drawbacks of
different types of philanthropic programs and who makes
charitable donations.
In this study, we take a step toward relaxing such
implicit assumptions by examining how the nature of
corporate philanthropic programs and the characteristics
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of firms that engage in such programs may differentially
affect stakeholder perceptions and, thus, firm value. In par-
ticular, we draw on the symbolic management literature
(e.g., Westphal and Zajac 1994, Zajac and Westphal 1995)
to argue that stakeholders’ perceptions of a firm’s motives
behind its corporate philanthropy programs will determine
the extent to which stakeholders provide cooperation and
support for the firm and thereby influence the financial
benefit that a firm obtains from its philanthropic activities.
This literature differentiates between activities that are
substantive and symbolic. We further extend this litera-
ture by incorporating the role of audience (stakeholder)
perceptions. In particular, we argue that the level of
substantiveness of firm actions is not solely determined
by the actions themselves; instead, it is influenced by
how stakeholders perceive the actions. When a firm’s
philanthropic acts are perceived as being substantive by
stakeholders, corporate philanthropy is likely to be more
positively associated with firm value; conversely, if the
firm’s philanthropic acts are perceived as largely symbolic,
the firm will benefit less from charitable acts.
Because firms’ motives behind corporate philanthropy
are largely unobservable, stakeholders must rely on vari-
ous information cues to assess the extent to which firms’
philanthropic activities are substantive or symbolic. Cor-
porate giving can be broadly classified into two types:
quantitative (generous giving) and qualitative (innovative
giving). The amount of giving can serve as a quantitative
information cue, where more generous giving may be
perceived as more substantive than less generous giving.
In contrast, a qualitative information cue can relate to
the nature of the philanthropic activities (McShane and
Cunningham 2012). Innovative philanthropic activities are
more likely to require considerable effort and have a posi-
tive, long-term social impact on the receiving communities.
Contrary to less innovative giving, such philanthropic
programs are more likely to be perceived by stakeholders
as being substantive rather than symbolic.
Although both generous giving and innovative giving
can be considered substantive, there may still be dif-
ferences across these two dimensions of philanthropic
activities in terms of the degree of perceived substantive-
ness. In general, because innovative giving is associated
with more thoughtful considerations given to charitable
program selection and requires greater involvement from
the part of the firm, the value propositions of innovative
giving are likely to be more salient than are those of
generous giving. Therefore, we expect that stakeholders
are likely to value innovative giving (i.e., qualitative aspect
of giving) more than generous giving (i.e., quantitative
aspect of giving).
In addition to the quantity and quality of a firm’s
philanthropic activities, stakeholders may use certain
firm characteristics as additional information cues that
can help them infer the firm’s sincerity in giving. First,
firms that provide “sinful” products and services (alcohol,
tobacco, or gaming) are subject to additional scrutiny
from stakeholders, under which generous giving (i.e., the
quantitative aspect) is even more likely to be questioned
than innovative giving (i.e., the qualitative aspect). As a
result, we expect that the difference between generous and
innovative giving in terms of their effects on firm value is
more salient among sinful firms. Second, the life-cycle
stage that a firm is in may also influence how stakeholders
perceive firms’ philanthropic activities. In particular, firms
that are in the Mature stage are often considered cash
cows with limited investment opportunities; thus, generous
giving by such firms may not be considered as sincere as
innovative giving. In contrast, generous giving by firms in
the Growth or Shakeout stages, where they are generally in
need of extra resources, is likely to be perceived as more
sincere and substantive. Thus, the gap between generous
and innovative giving is reduced within these two stages.
We investigate the impact of the type of corporate phil-
anthropic activities and heterogeneity in firms engaging in
such activities on firm value using a sample covering U.S.
firms’ philanthropic activities over a 19-year period from
1991 to 2009. In line with our hypotheses, our results are
largely consistent with philanthropic activities that we
expect to be perceived as more substantive, either because
of the amount and nature of the philanthropic activities or
the characteristics of the firm engaging in philanthropic
activities, and thus have a stronger impact on firm value.
We aim to make several contributions in this paper.
First, with rare exceptions (e.g., McShane and Cunning-
ham 20121), the corporate philanthropy literature has
largely ignored the nature of these activities and the
factors that differentiate the firms pursuing such activities.
We contribute to this literature by addressing this critical
omission and by showing that the nature of a firm’s
philanthropic activities and a firm’s characteristics indeed
affect how much value a firm creates by pursuing philan-
thropic activities. Hence, our theoretical refinements help
explain considerable variation in the impact of corporate
philanthropy on firms’ value and some of the apparent
contradictions in the existing literature.
Second, we contribute to the growing literature on
symbolic management. Previous literature in this area
has mainly defined symbolism and substantiveness based
on actual firm actions and has underplayed the role that
stakeholders play in determining whether these actions
are perceived as symbolic and substantive. We extend
this literature by incorporating the role of audience per-
ceptions and arguing that the level of substantiveness
of firm actions (engaging in corporate philanthropy in
our context) is not only determined by the actions them-
selves but also influenced by how audiences (stakeholders
in our context) perceive the actions. In particular, we
believe that firm features, such as the type of products
or services that a firm provides, and the life-cycle stage
of the firm affect how stakeholders perceive a firm’s
philanthropic actions. This highlights the importance of
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incorporating how audiences perceive a firm’s actions to
improve our understanding of the (performance) impli-
cations of firms’ actions. Moreover, most studies in the
symbolic management literature examine when, how, and
why firms use symbolic and/or substantive actions (e.g.,
Westphal and Zajac 1994, McDonnell et al. 2011, Marquis
and Qian 2014), but relatively less attention has been
paid to investigating the performance implications of
pursuing symbolic and substantive actions. The few stud-
ies that have examined the performance implications of
these actions have generally not explicitly contrasted and
compared the value effects of symbolic and substantive
actions. We fill this void by showing that in the context
of corporate philanthropy, actions that are perceived to
be more substantive clearly have greater impact on firm
value than symbolic actions. Finally, the extant literature
has not addressed the issue of variation in the saliency of
substantive actions. We provide the first known evidence
to suggest that the qualitative aspect of actions, compared
with the quantitative aspect, has a more salient effect on
the substantiveness of these actions.
Background
Different Types of Corporate Philanthropy
Firms face increasing institutional pressures from their
stakeholders to behave in socially responsible ways (e.g.,
Marquis et al. 2007). As a result, they need to balance
stakeholders’ demands for corporate social responsibility
amid the need to maximize corporate profitability. One
important area of corporate social activities that draws
substantial stakeholder attention is corporate philanthropy.
Indeed, employees, customers, suppliers, and even some
shareholders have come to perceive corporate philan-
thropy as an appropriate and legitimate corporate activity
(Margolis and Walsh 2003, Sharfman 1994). For example,
customers often perceive firms engaging in corporate
philanthropy as having better product quality and cus-
tomer care (Adams and Hardwick 1998) and thus tend to
support such firms by increasing their demand for a firm’s
products or services or by paying premium prices (e.g.,
Sen and Bhattacharya 2001, Lev et al. 2010, Dunn and
Norton 2013, Norton and Avery 2014). Some investors,
especially managers of socially responsible funds, are
even more willing to invest in firms that are known
for their corporate philanthropy (Barnett and Salomon
2006, Graves and Waddock 1994, Johnson and Greening
1999). Moreover, the government may pressure firms to
engage in corporate philanthropy by selectively providing
government support to certain firms based on the extent to
which they engage in philanthropic activities (Wang and
Qian 2011). Finally, creditors may encourage firms that
engage in corporate philanthropy or punish those that do
not by controlling firms’ access to credit (Neiheisel 1994).
Hence, corporate philanthropy may have the potential
to help firms gain the support of various stakeholders,
which will, in turn, have a positive impact on firm value.
Accordingly, more and more firms have been observed to
engage in philanthropic activities in recent years.
As the number of firms engaging in philanthropy has
increased, so has the diversity in firms’ philanthropy
programs. Namely, firms that engage in philanthropy
often have different underlying motives, and their pro-
grams often differ considerably in a number of important
characteristics such as size and content. Broadly speaking,
corporate philanthropy programs can be classified based
on two dimensions: the quantitative aspect of the program
(i.e., the amount of giving) and the qualitative aspect
of the program (i.e., the type of giving). In quantitative
terms, corporate philanthropy programs can differ in the
amount of giving, which may indicate how generous firms
appear to be. Although many firms engage in some form
of charitable donations such as small cash donations to
aid local civic causes (e.g., Porter and Kramer 2002),
some firms stand out by donating considerably large
amounts to charitable causes. We label the latter type
of corporate philanthropy programs as generous giving.
In addition to variations across firms in terms of quantity
or amount of giving, firms can opt for different levels
of engagement and involvement with their philanthropic
activities, regardless of the dollar amount that they spend.
In particular, corporate philanthropy programs can be
carefully designed to be more innovative and aimed at
promoting self-sufficiency among the recipients. Such
programs are more likely to be associated with putting
in considerable effort and/or positive long-term social
impacts on the recipients, and we label this type of
corporate philanthropy program as innovative giving.
Symbolic and Substantive Actions
From an institutional theory perspective, firms engage in
actions in response to the pressures that they face from
their environment and their stakeholders (e.g., Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978). Broadly speaking, firms can respond to
these pressures in two ways: by using either symbolic or
substantive actions (e.g., Zajac and Westphal 1995).
Symbolic actions are actions aimed mainly at manag-
ing stakeholders’ perceptions and thereby improving a
firm’s legitimacy while being decoupled from the true
purpose of the action. Examples of firms using symbolic
management to achieve conformity and compliance with
the pressure of stakeholders without any true substance
come in various forms. For example, Zajac and Westphal
(1995) found that firms can satisfy external demands
for increased accountability to shareholders by adopting
but not implementing long-term incentive plans. In line
with this finding, Weaver et al. (1999) showed that some
firms form ethics committees purely as a symbolic action
for external appearance without any actual substance.
In contrast, substantive actions are those that are aimed
at actually meeting the true, underlying purpose of the
actions stakeholders expect. For example, firms undertake
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substantive actions when they adopt and implement long-
term incentive plans to meet pressure from shareholders
for increased accountability (Zajac and Westphal 1995).
Hence, their actions are consistent with the underlying
purpose of why shareholders pressure firms to undertake
such actions.
The distinction between symbolic and substantive
actions has been employed in various settings. For exam-
ple, Zajac and Westphal (1995) looked at CEO compensa-
tion contracts and found evidence that CEO compensation
reflects both substance and symbolism. Looking at the
same context, Westphal and Zajac (1994) observed that
early adaptors are more likely to use long-term incentive
plans in a more substantive way but that late adaptors
do so more in a symbolic way to pursue legitimacy.
Christmann and Taylor (2006) attempted to explain the
conditions under which suppliers in China are more likely
to implement quality management standards in a sub-
stantive way rather than in a symbolic way. Others have
distinguished between symbolic and substantive actions
in the contexts of bankruptcies (e.g., McDonnell et al.
2011), entrepreneurial firms (e.g., Zott and Huy 2007),
and corporate social responsibility (CSR) (e.g., Short and
Toffel 2010).
The importance of differentiating between substantive
and symbolic actions has also recently been identified
in the CSR literature, including that on corporate phi-
lanthropy. For example, Marquis and Qian (2014) differ-
entiated between more symbolic and substantive CSR
reporting by Chinese firms and looked at what drives
them to comply with stakeholders’ demands in a more
symbolic or substantive manner. Arya and Zhang (2009,
p. 1096) argued that substantive charitable initiatives in
South Africa that demonstrate corporate commitment to
long-term social change might reduce fears that “corpora-
tions might be pursuing symbolism over substance.” Short
and Toffel (2010) looked at the conditions under which
firms’ symbolic actions to self-regulate their air pollutant
emissions are likely to result in actual implementation
and found that the legal framework plays a crucial role.
Although these studies have highlighted that some forms
of CSR and philanthropy are more symbolic and others
are more substantial, they have not investigated the per-
formance implications of symbolic versus substantive
actions. More broadly, explicitly comparing the relative
performance implications of symbolic and substantive
actions has received little attention in the literature.
Although the objective of symbolic actions is to manage
stakeholder perceptions, stakeholders are often able to
at least partially differentiate between symbolic and
substantive actions based on certain information cues.
As a result, these information cues have an impact on
how stakeholders perceive and respond to firms’ actions
and consequently influence firms’ financial performance.
Hence, it might not be sufficient to differentiate between
symbolic and substantive actions based on the actions
themselves, as previous research has highlighted, but
it is crucial to incorporate stakeholder perceptions of
firm actions into our understanding of symbolism and
substantiveness and their implications for firm value.
In addition, firms may engage in a variety of actions that
are substantive in nature. However, the existing literature
has not differentiated between types of substantive actions
and studied how different firm characteristics, which will
act as important information cues, impact stakeholders’
perception of how substantive these actions are. In this
study, we highlight that certain philanthropic actions may
be considered substantive if they are carried out by some
firms. However, the same actions may be considered less
substantive if they are carried out by other firms.
Theory
Symbolically and Substantively Perceived
Philanthropy Programs and Firm Value
As noted by Godfrey (2005), the motives stakeholders
infer to be driving corporate philanthropy are important in
determining whether philanthropic giving can generate the
positive moral capital that is necessary to enhance firm
value. Therefore, to clearly understand the relationship
between corporate philanthropy and firm value, it is
important to incorporate stakeholders’ perceptions of the
intentions behind a firm’s charitable acts. In particular,
because stakeholders are likely to perceive some forms of
philanthropy to be more symbolic than other forms, the
characteristics of a firm’s philanthropy program will have
important value implications for that firm.
As highlighted above, corporate philanthropy programs
can be classified based on two dimensions: the quantitative
aspect of the program (i.e., the amount of giving) and
the qualitative aspect of the program (i.e., the type of
giving). Generous giving can lend greater credibility to
the program as a greater amount of a firm’s resources are
committed and accordingly enhance the firm’s reputation
as a sincere donor. Hence, stakeholders will perceive
this type of giving as being more substantive than that
of firms that engage only in donating smaller amounts.
It is important to emphasize that we are not arguing
that less generous giving has little or no social impact.
Instead, although less generous philanthropic activities
are more likely to be perceived as being symbolic, they
may still help firms at least partially meet the pressure
from their stakeholders to do good. However, we expect
that generous giving is perceived to be more substantive
and will have a greater effect on firm value than will
actions that are perceived to be symbolic.
In sum, substantive actions in the form of generous
giving are more likely to be perceived as sincere and
to improve a firm’s public image, build rapport with
stakeholders, and elicit positive responses and support
from the firm’s stakeholders; more symbolic philanthropic
activities will have less potential to achieve this. This
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is in line with most previous studies that have assumed
that the performance benefits of corporate philanthropy
are associated with the amount or the size of corporate
donations, overlooking differences in how firms engage
in philanthropy. Accordingly, we have the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Ceteris paribus, the valuation of
firms engaging in generous giving is higher than that of
firms that do not engage in generous giving.
In addition to the amount of giving, firms may vary
qualitatively in terms of the “innovativeness” of their
giving activities and in terms of their level of engagement
and involvement in their activities. In innovative giving,
firms carefully design corporate philanthropy programs
to be aimed at promoting self-sufficiency among the
recipients by putting in considerable effort and/or enforc-
ing positive long-term social impacts on the recipients.
Such innovative giving can lend greater credibility to
the program and thus enhance the giving firm’s reputa-
tion as a genuine and sincere donor in the eyes of its
stakeholders. Firms engaging in this type of philanthropy
can more credibly signal to their stakeholders that their
programs represent a sincere commitment to the benefits
of the recipients. It also signals a firm’s sincerity and
genuine concerns about charitable causes. Accordingly,
we expect that innovative giving will be perceived as
more substantive and, as a result, that it will be more
likely to meet the pressures of stakeholders. Consequently,
we expect the following:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Ceteris paribus, the valuation of
firms engaging in innovative giving is higher than that of
firms that do not engage in innovative giving.
So far, we have argued that both the qualitative and
quantitative dimensions of corporate philanthropy pro-
grams will matter and that both generous giving and
innovative giving can be perceived as substantive. How-
ever, the qualitative and quantitative aspects of corporate
giving may not be valued equally.
In light of public skepticism about business ethics, firms
that can demonstrate that their philanthropy programs
have a significant impact on social concerns may gain
more credibility with respect to their genuine motives
in engaging in such programs than those that are mere
generous givers (Porter and Kramer 2002). In addition,
generous giving in terms of quantity is more susceptible
to abuses, where it is used to exploit fashionable causes to
increase firm visibility or for other self-serving purposes
(Balotti and Hanks 1999, Friedman 1970, Galaskiewicz
1997, Haley 1991, Porter and Kramer 2002). As such,
whereas generous giving generally may be motivated
by genuine good intentions, it remains more susceptible
to perception of a lack of thought, inefficient use of
substantial financial resources, and/or insincere ingra-
tiation. In contrast, innovative giving is more likely to
be associated with putting in considerable effort and a
greater degree of firm involvement. Thus, its positive
social effects on the recipients and the sincerity of this
effort are more difficult to deny or fully discredit. Hence,
relatively speaking, the qualitative aspect of giving is
likely to be valued more than the quantitative aspect of
giving. Therefore, we predict the following:
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Ceteris paribus, the positive asso-
ciation between engaging in corporate philanthropy and
firm value is stronger for innovative giving than for
generous giving. In other words, the qualitative aspect
of giving has a stronger effect on firm value than the
quantitative aspect.
Characteristics of Philanthropic Firms and
Firm Value
So far, we have argued that both generous giving and
innovative giving may be perceived as substantive by
stakeholders. Moreover, compared with generous giving,
innovative giving can convey a more credible signal to
stakeholders about a firm’s sincerity in engaging in corpo-
rate philanthropic activities. Stakeholders’ assessment
of firms’ sincerity, however, may not be solely based
on the philanthropic “action” itself. In this section, we
examine how the characteristics of the “actor” (i.e., the
firm) may provide additional information cues that further
influence how substantive generous and innovative giving
are differentially perceived. In particular, we focus on
two firm characteristics: the type of products or services
that a firm provides and the operational life-cycle stage
of the firm. These are two important and salient character-
istics of a firm that provide stakeholders with additional
information cues about its sincerity in giving and whether
they perceive a firm’s giving as substantive or symbolic.
Furthermore, we argue that such additional information
cues may be perceived differently across the two types
of giving. Hence, these two firm characteristics allow
us to further explore the differences between the firm
value effects of the qualitative and quantitative aspects of
giving that we advanced above.
The first firm characteristic that we consider is the
nature of the products/services that firms provide or, more
specifically, whether the products or services that firms
provide are collectively known as the “triumvirate of
sin,” i.e., alcohol, tobacco, and gaming. Hereafter, we
label firms that provide one of these products or services
as “sin firms.” Although firms provide various types of
products and services, which can be classified in different
ways, the classification based on the “sin” dimension is
particularly relevant in the context of this paper because it
provides stakeholders with additional information cues for
assessing the underlying motives of a firm’s philanthropic
actions.
Because of the addictive nature and undesirable social
consequences of their products when they are consumed
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excessively, these products or services are viewed as sinful
by many individuals and groups (Hong and Kacperczyk
2009), and this view may be further used to infer the
motives or the underlying character of the firm. Corporate
philanthropy of firms that provide such products or
services is likely to be viewed with greater skepticism
because it appears to be in direct conflict with the firms’
products or services and may thus not carry much favor
with many stakeholders. Their philanthropic activities
may be perceived as “blood money” to atone for their
products’ ill effects. For example, when Philip Morris
made an annual commitment of $175 million in donations
in 1999, most critics dismissed it as an attempt to buy
respectability and legitimacy (Levin 1999). Therefore,
although generous giving might leave open more room for
skepticism about a firm’s sincerity (as discussed in H3),
this is especially true for sin firms, whose generous giving
may generate added skepticism or even cynicism.
In contrast, innovative giving emphasizes the sustained
benefit to the recipients, so its objectives are more con-
gruent with most stakeholders’ ethical values and are
thus more likely to generate positive moral capital among
them (Godfrey 2005). Although stakeholders may view
innovative giving by sin firms more skeptically than
that by nonsin firms, the additional thought and effort
that this giving requires and its focus on creating a sus-
tained positive social impact on the recipients makes the
substantive nature of the action more difficult to deny.
Thus, to the extent that innovative giving can credibly
convey sin firms’ genuine motives in their charitable
acts, stakeholders may still appreciate their efforts and
be less likely to discount the benefits of their innovative
giving—that is, stakeholders are not indiscriminant in
their assessments of the merits of substantive corporate
philanthropy. Such assessment is contingent on both the
nature of the firm’s philanthropic actions (qualitative
versus quantitative) and the perceived morality of the firm
that provides the necessary context to assess the sincerity
of the firm’s philanthropic actions.
In sum, stakeholders are likely to discount the benefits
of generous giving by sin firms to a greater extent than
innovative giving by sin firms. As such, we predict the
following:
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Ceteris paribus, for firms provid-
ing sinful products or services, the positive value effect
of engaging in generous giving decreases more than the
positive value effect of engaging in innovative giving.
Economic theory posits that firms evolve over time and
proceed through distinct life-cycle stages (e.g., Jovanovic
1982; Spence 1977, 1979; Wernerfelt 1985). These life-
cycle stages coincide with different levels of growth,
availability of resources, investment opportunities, and
risk. We argue that the life-cycle stage that the firm is
in serves as another information cue facilitating stake-
holder assessment of firm sincerity when engaging in
corporate philanthropy programs. In particular, we are
interested in understanding how generous and innovative
giving are perceived differently depending on a firm’s
life cycle, which is classified into the following three
stages: the Growth stage where firms are in an upward
trend, the Mature stage where firms are largely stable, and
the Shakeout stage where firms face intense challenges
that they must overcome to avoid decline.
First, firms that are in the Mature stage are typically
endowed with substantial levels of resources. Because of
growth opportunities leveling off in this stage, the firm
is likely to enjoy a large amount of financial resources
but limited new investment opportunities. Considering
that stakeholders may question firms’ motives for giving,
generous giving of large amounts, i.e., the quantitative
aspect of giving, might be perceived as being too easy
when firms are in a stage of their cycle where they have
substantial levels of resources coupled with limited oppor-
tunities to deploy these resources. Hence, stakeholders
are likely to see generous giving by these firms as less
substantive; as a result, the quantitative aspect of giving
may be further discounted. In contrast, innovative giving
requires greater firm involvement and commitment; as a
result, it is more difficult for stakeholders to deny that it
is substantive and aimed at doing good, regardless of a
firm’s resource and investment opportunity situation. We
thus expect that the gap between generous and innovative
giving in terms of their firm value effect may be more
salient when a firm is in the Mature stage.
Second, during the Growth stage, economic theory
suggests that firms can maximize revenue growth by
capturing market share and engaging in preemptive invest-
ment that can create barriers to entry (e.g., Jovanovic
1982; Spence 1977, 1979; Wernerfelt 1985). To this end,
firms in the Growth stage typically require a large amount
of capital. For example, greater funds are required for
increasing capital investment in property, plant, and equip-
ment, to increase capacity to meet the growing market
demands and to achieve economies of scale. Research and
development funds will also be needed to make changes
to the product or services to better reflect customers’
needs and suggestions. In addition, greater marketing
efforts need to be made to differentiate a firm’s offerings
from other competitors within the industry. Thus, although
profits might be generated in a firm’s Growth stage, the
firm often finds itself short of the funds required to sustain
current growth and support future growth. In such a
situation, if a firm still allocates resources for generous
giving, it is more difficult for stakeholders to deny or
fully discredit its philanthropic efforts, given that it is
willing to dedicate scarce resources for philanthropic acts.
Third, for firms in the Shakeout stage, we also expect
that generous giving will be perceived as more substan-
tive. In this stage, firm growth decreases and profits are
squeezed. When a firm is in a stage of its life cycle that
imposes significant challenges, its resources, especially
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financial ones, become critical for its survival. As a result,
firms in this stage also tend to be resource constrained,
although for different reasons than those in the Growth
stage. In this case, it would be difficult to deny that
generous giving by firms in the Shakeout stage is driven
by sincere motivations. Therefore, in both the Growth
and Shakeout stages, it is likely that both generous and
innovative giving are considered substantive; thus, the
gap between their value effect is likely to be narrowed.
In sum, we expect generous giving to be discounted in
the Mature stage but less so or not at all in the Growth and
Stakeout stage. At the same time, we argue that innovative
giving is perceived as being substantive, regardless of the
life cycle that the firm is in. Hence, the impact of the two
types of giving will differ most in the Mature stage but
not as considerably in the other two stages. Accordingly,
we predict the following:
Hypothesis 5 (H5). Ceteris paribus, for firms that are
in the mature stage, the value of engaging in innovative
giving is higher than that of engaging in generous giving,
but there is a smaller or no such difference for firms in
either the growth or shakeout stages of their life cycle.
Research Design
Data and Sample
The Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini, and Co. (KLD) and
Compustat databases are the two major data sources used
for this study. For the benefits of corporate philanthropy
to be incorporated into firm value, such activities must
be sufficiently substantial and visible to stakeholders
(Godfrey et al. 2009). Corporate philanthropy that captures
independent rating agencies’ attention meets both criteria.
This makes the KLD data suitable for investigating
the value implications of firms’ corporate philanthropic
activities. Although the KLD data has its shortcomings
and limitations, similar to any database, it is widely
used in business and social research and is currently
considered to be the best available data for measuring
firms’ corporate social responsibility activities (Choi and
Wang 2009, Graves and Waddock 1994, Hillman and
Keim 2001, Waddock and Graves 1997).
First, we obtained information on firms’ philanthropic
activities from the KLD database for a 19-year period
from 1991 to 2009. Subsequently, we merged these data
with the Compustat database to obtain information on the
firms’ financial performance and other firm-level variables.
This resulted in a final sample of 3,409 firms and 20,418
firm-year observations that we used to test our hypotheses.
Dependent Variable
Firm Value0 Our dependent variable is measured as the
firm’s share price obtained from Compustat. We focused
on firm value because it represents the present value of
expected net future benefits and costs. This is particularly
important because the benefits of corporate philanthropy
in securing access to critical resources would, in essence,
focus on long-term benefits that their charitable acts can
derive. Moreover, although stakeholders’ perceptions of a
firm’s corporate philanthropy are not directly observable,
considerable evidence (e.g., Godfrey et al. 2009, Muller
and Kräussl 2011, Ramchander et al. 2012, Flammer
2013, Madsen and Rodgers 2015) suggests that financial
markets and investors incorporate the impact of socially
responsible activities on a broad set of stakeholders’
attitudes and behavior and, thus, on the future cash flows
and value of the firm (for a general but more detailed
discussion on this issue, please also see, for example,
Mackey et al. 2007). Hence, our dependent variable
allows us to investigate the impact of different types of
philanthropy and whether stakeholders perceive them
as being more or less sincere and substantive on the
valuation of firms.
Independent Variables
Generous Giving and Innovative Giving0 We focused
on two separate KLD data items that are consistent with
our theoretical constructs of generous and innovative
giving.2 The first item captures our concept of “generous
giving” and is defined as firms that have “consistently
given over 1.5% of trailing three-year net earnings before
taxes (NEBT) to charity, or [have] otherwise been notably
generous in [their] giving.”3 The second item captures
our concept of “innovative giving” and is defined as
firms that have “a notably innovative giving program
that supports nonprofit organizations, particularly those
promoting self-sufficiency among the economically dis-
advantaged.” Subsequently two dummy variables were
created. These two dummy variables are labeled, respec-
tively, as Generous Giving and Innovative Giving and take
a value of one if a firm was identified in the KLD data as
exhibiting strengths in the corresponding type of giving
and zero when the firm only engaged in nongenerous
giving or noninnovative giving. Both variables are lagged
and measured in the previous year to ensure that they
precede the dependent and other independent variables
to reduce reverse causality concerns and to ensure that
stakeholders have sufficient time to obtain the necessary
information to respond to a firm’s corporate philanthropy.
To further ensure that our measures from the KLD
database are consistent with our theoretical constructs
of generous and innovative giving, we contacted a data
consultant at MSCI, the company that currently manages
the KLD database. The data consultant confirmed that up
to 2009, the KLD variables indeed correspond with our
theoretical constructs and that the main component of
the variable that we label “innovative giving” is about
promoting “self-sufficiency.”4 This leaves us confident
about the validity of our measures, that there are clear
and substantial differences between the types of giving
and that these differences correspond to our theoretical
constructs.
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Firms Providing Sinful Products or Services0 Consistent
with the definition used by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009),
we identified sin firms as those with products and services
that are collectively known as the triumvirate of sin,
i.e., alcohol, tobacco, and gaming. We created a dummy
variable that takes the value one if a firm operates in one
of these three businesses and zero otherwise.
Firm Life-Cycle0 We follow Dickinson’s (2011) method
of classifying firm life-cycle stages using the patterns
of firms’ cash flows that are decomposed into various
specific activities. Dickinson showed that her classification
captures firm characteristics that are consistent with
economic theory, which describes firms in each of those
stages, and that her classification captures a firm’s life-
cycle stages more accurately than other existing measures.
In line with Gort and Klepper (1982), firms are initially
classified into five stages: Introduction, Growth, Mature,
Shakeout, and Decline based on differences in the patterns
of their net cash flows from operations, financing and
investing.5 To facilitate our empirical tests, we combine
the introduction and growth stages as Growth stage and
the shakeout and decline stages as Shakeout stage.6
Empirical Model Specifications
The ad hoc nature of the empirical models adopted by
extant studies on corporate social responsibility (including
corporate philanthropy) and financial performance relation
has been criticized (e.g., Margolis and Walsh 2001,
McWilliams and Siegel 2000). In this study, we deviate
from such ad hoc approaches by using the residual income
model to theoretically motivate our empirical model
specifications. Although the residual income model has
a long tradition and has frequently been used in the
accounting and finance literature because of its advantages
(e.g., Edwards and Bell 1961, Peasnell 1982, Preinreich
1938, Ohlson 1995, Dong et al. 2006, Zhang 2006, Ma
et al. 2011), it has only been introduced to the strategic
management literature relatively recently (for recent
examples, see Koh et al. 2014). We describe the basic
empirical implementation of the model and some of
its desirable characteristics here. For a more detailed
and technical explanation of the model, please refer to
Ohlson (1995).
Specifically, the empirical implementation of the the-
oretical residual income model expresses equity value
(price) as a function of a firm’s (i) fundamentals (the
book value of equity, BVE, and earnings, EARN); and
(ii) other information (for our purpose, whether a firm
is known for being a generous or innovative giver), as
follows:
Pt = 0 +1BVEt +2EARN t +3Generous Givingt−1
+4Innovative Givingt−1 +èINDUSTRY
+èYEAR + et1 (1)
where P is a firm’s share price at the end of fiscal year t,
BVE is the book value of its equity (per share) at the end
of year t, EARN is its earnings (per share) in year t, and
èYEAR and èINDUSTRY are year and industry (based
on four-digit SIC codes)7 fixed effects.8 To test H4, we
introduce Sin Firm as another variable interact it with
Generous Giving and Innovative Giving. For H5, we
introduce Growth and Shakeout as two indicator variables
to identify whether firms are, respectively, in the Growth
or Shakeout stages of their life cycle. We also interact
these two indicator variables with Generous Giving and
Innovative Giving.
This empirical approach has a number of advantages
that make it particularly suited to test our hypotheses.
First, the residual income model provides the theoret-
ical foundations to incorporate both firm fundamental
and nonfundamental information (in this case, corporate
philanthropy) into the firm valuation function and thus
facilitates a more structured and systematic assessment of
the valuation effects of corporate philanthropy. Second,
the residual income model is specified in such a way
that it avoids the need for having a considerable set of
control variables without being at risk of having an under-
specified model. Specifically, the two firm fundamental
measures that are built into the model, i.e., book value of
equity (BVEt5 and earnings (EARN t5, summarize a firm’s
entire financial performance and the financial positions
that appear on its financial statements. This alleviates
any possible omitted variable problems relating to firm
financial information.9 Furthermore, the key variables
in the model (Pt , BVEt , and EARN t5 are expressed on a
per share basis that normalizes firm size in the model.
Overall, this leaves the empirical implementation of the
residual income model elegantly simple. Third, the model
is designed to be invariant to different accounting practices
by firms making it far less sensitive to such choices than
other approaches. Altogether, this makes empirical model
specifications motivated by the residual income model
ideal to test our hypotheses.
Estimation Procedure
We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models
to estimate our coefficients with robust standard errors
that are heteroskedasticity consistent and that adjust for
firm-level clustering (i.e., nonindependence between obser-
vations from the same firm). We also check the robustness
of our estimation approach by using different model
specifications, including two-stage Heckman specifications
in the robustness section of the paper.
Results
Descriptive statistics for the data and a correlation matrix
are presented in Table 1. Consistent with the valuation
model, the equity book value (BVE) and earnings per
share (EARN) are strongly correlated with a firm’s equity
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Firm Value 29033 19093
2 BVE 12049 15059 0045∗∗∗
3 EARN 1009 2014 0061∗∗∗ 0039∗∗∗
4 Giving 0007 0025 0017∗∗∗ 0005∗∗∗ 0011∗∗∗
5 Generous Givingt−1 0004 0019 0011∗∗∗ 0004∗∗∗ 0008∗∗∗ 0076∗∗∗
6 Innovative Givingt−1 0003 0018 0013∗∗∗ 0003∗∗∗ 0008∗∗∗ 0071∗∗∗ 0018∗∗∗
7 Sin Firm 0001 0012 0006∗∗∗ 0000 0004∗∗∗ 0006∗∗∗ 0004∗∗∗ 0004∗∗∗
8 Growth Stage 0037 0048 −0006∗∗∗ −0004∗∗∗ −0011∗∗∗ −0008∗∗∗ −0004∗∗∗ −0007∗∗∗ −0010
9 Mature Stage 0050 0050 0017∗∗∗ 0008∗∗∗ 0021∗∗∗ 0011∗∗∗ 0006∗∗∗ 0010∗∗∗ 0002∗∗∗ −0076∗∗∗
10 Shakeout Stage 0013 0034 −0017∗∗∗ −0007∗∗∗ −0015∗∗∗ −0005∗∗∗ −0003∗∗∗ −0004∗∗∗ −0002∗∗ −0030∗∗∗ −0039∗∗∗
Notes. The sample size is 20,418. All tests are two tailed: ∗∗p < 0001; ∗∗∗p < 00001.
value 4P5. We also observe a significant positive cor-
relation between a firm’s equity value and corporate
philanthropy (Generous Giving and Innovative Giving),
thus providing preliminary evidence that stakeholders
value corporate giving favorably. In addition, only approx-
imately 4% and 3% of our sample observations engaged
in generous giving and innovative giving, respectively.10
Consistent with our arguments, these percentages suggests
that engaging in generous or innovative giving is not
the norm and that firms can engage in these types of
giving to convey the substantiveness of their corporate
philanthropic actions and differentiate themselves from
other firms.
Table 2 provides the regression results to test our
hypotheses. Model 1 presents the baseline valuation model.
In Model 2, we add our primary explanatory variables, i.e.,
Generous Giving and Innovative Giving. The F -statistics
show that every model provides a significant improvement
in fit (p < 00001) relative to an intercept-only model.
Furthermore, the F -statistics of the models, which include
our giving measures, show that adding these measures
to the baseline model with only the control variables
(Model 1) statistically increases the fit of the model
(p < 00001).
As expected for our type of valuation model, the
results in Model 1 reveal that both the firm’s equity
book value and its earnings per share have a positive and
significant (p < 00001) effect on firm value. Consistent
with H1 and H2, the coefficients in Model 2 of both
Generous Giving (p < 0005) and Innovative Giving (p <
00001) are positive and significant. After comparing both
coefficients by conducting an F -test, we find that the
positive association between engaging in innovative giving
and firm value is stronger than that between engaging
in generous giving and firm value (p < 0005), which
is consistent with H3. Collectively, these findings offer
support for H1–H3.
Examining the practical magnitudes of the hypothesized
effects confirms the above inferences. The practical impact
of innovative giving on firm value is approximately 2.8
times larger than that of generous giving. Furthermore,
the positive relationship between a firm’s earnings and its
valuation is well established and considered important
in the literature, which makes it suitable to use as an
anchor to benchmark the effect sizes of our two giving
variables (e.g., Ertug and Castellucci 2013). Specifically,
we compare the practical magnitudes of the effects of the
two giving variables with that of the effect of earnings
by comparing the effect on the dependent variable of a
one-standard-deviation change in the continuous earnings
variable with the effect of engaging in generous giving
(compared with nongenerous) or engaging in innovative
giving (compared with noninnovative giving) (i.e., a
change from zero to one in the giving dummy variables).
The effect of innovative giving on the firm’s valuation
is 65% of that of the firm’s earnings, and the effect of
generous giving is 23% that of a firm’s earnings. It is
not surprising that the effects of our giving variables
are smaller than that of the firm’s earnings, but they
still have a substantial impact on the firm’s valuation.
In addition, when we look at the practical magnitudes of
our hypothesized effects in absolute amounts, we observe
that moving from a nongenerous giver to a generous
giver is associated with an increase in share price of
$2.16 but that a move from a noninnovative giver to
an innovative giver is associated with a $6.11 increase
in share price. This is somewhat less than the effect
of a one-standard-deviation change in earnings that is
associated with an increase of $9.41 in share price, but it
is still significant. Hence, the economic magnitudes of
these effects are realistic and consistent with the statistical
significance of our findings.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that the benefits of engaging
in generous giving by sin firms are discounted to a
greater extent than are those of innovative giving. In
Model 3, we find that the coefficient of the interaction term
Sin Firm × Generous Giving is negative and significant
(p < 0005), which suggests that investors discount the
value of generous giving by sin firms. In contrast, the
coefficient of the Sin Firm × Innovative Giving term is
not significant. Therefore, it seems that investors do not
discount the value of innovative giving, even if it is by a
sin firm. Consistent with these findings, additional tests
reveal that the coefficient of the Sin Firm × Generous
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Table 2 Regression Results
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 250843∗∗∗ 250108∗∗∗ 250057∗∗∗ 250720∗∗∗
43 09445 43 09385 43 0939 5 43 09485
BVEt 00323∗∗∗ 00322∗∗∗ 00323∗∗∗ 00323∗∗∗
40 00835 40 0082 5 40 00835 40 0082 5
EARNt 40435∗∗∗ 40398∗∗∗ 40396∗∗∗ 40289∗∗∗
40 01865 40 01835 40 01845 40 0182 5
Generous Givingt−1 H1 20162∗ 20393∗ 10442
40 0990 5 410009 5 4100565
Innovative Givingt−1 H2 60109∗∗∗ 60004∗∗∗ 60094∗∗∗
410389 5 410439 5 4104655
Sin Firmt 50198
43 02535
Sin Firmt ×Generous Givingt−1 H4 −60970∗
43 0040 5
Sin Firmt × Innovative Givingt−1 H4 10905
43 0420 5
Growth Staget −00840∗∗
40 02955
Growth Staget ×Generous Givingt−1 00255
4104735
Growth Staget × Innovative Givingt−1 −10022
4106485
Shakeout Staget −40343∗∗∗
40 03745
Shakeout Staget ×Generous Givingt−1 70614∗
43 0210 5
Shakeout Staget × Innovative Givingt−1 00317
43 00515
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included
Year dummies Included Included Included Included
Observations 20,418 20,418 20,418 20,418
R2 00489 00493 00493 00497
Model F -tests 71016∗∗∗ 72037∗∗∗ 79044∗∗∗ 71005∗∗∗
Hypothesis 3 4Model 25: Null hypotheses and p-values of the F-tests:
• Generous Giving= Innovative Giving2 p-value= 0.027
Hypothesis 5 4Model 45: Null hypotheses and p-values of the F-tests2
• Mature Stage: (Generous= Innovative): p-value= 0.011
• Growth Stage: (Generous Giving+Growth×Generous Giving) p-value= 0.184
= (Innovative Giving+Growth× Innovative Giving):
• Shakeout Stage: (Generous Giving+Shakeout×Generous Giving) p-value= 0.610
= (Innovative Giving+Shakeout× Innovative Giving):
Notes. The robust standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. All tests are two tailed:
∗p < 0005; ∗∗p < 0001; ∗∗∗p < 00001.
Giving term was significantly smaller than that of the Sin
Firm × Innovative Giving term (p < 0005). As such, we
find support consistent with H4.
Hypothesis 5 predicts that the value of engaging in
innovative giving is higher than that of engaging in gener-
ous giving in the Mature stage but that there are no such
differences when a firm is in either the Growth or Shake-
out stages of its life cycle. Accordingly, we performed
F -tests to examine whether the effects of generous giving
on firm values differ from those of innovative giving in
each of the three life-cycle stages.11 The tests revealed
that the relation between generous giving and firm value is
weaker than that between innovative giving and firm value
(p < 0005) in the Mature stage. In contrast, the effects of
generous giving and innovative giving do not statistically
differ from each other in the Growth and Shakeout stages
(p-values = 0.184 and 0.610, respectively). Hence, our
findings are consistent with H5.
Robustness Checks and Additional Analyses
We performed several supplementary analyses to ensure
the robustness of our main findings. First, considering
the structure of our data, our main analysis corrected
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for potential dependency among observations from the
same firm across time by using clustered robust standard
errors. When we reran our analysis without such standard
error correction, we continued to find evidence consistent
with our main findings, though with stronger statistical
significance for our variable of interests. As such, our
reported main findings are more conservative.
Another concern relates to potential endogeneity in
firms’ choice of corporate philanthropy program. We
employ the two-stage Heckman (1979) selection model to
ensure that our findings are not driven by any endogeneity
issues. We start with a straightforward application of
Heckman’s model with a first stage, in which we run
a probit regression of whether a firm is engaging in
either generous or innovative giving on a series of known
factors that determine corporate philanthropy. Specifi-
cally, these factors include the lagged share price, current
ratio, debt ratio, firm size, book-to-market ratio, R&D
intensity, advertising intensity, age, the proportion of
firms in an industry that is known for corporate philan-
thropy, and industry dummies. The lagged share price
variable is included in the first-stage model to allow
for potential reverse causality, i.e., the possibility that
firms with better performance are more likely to engage
in corporate philanthropic activities. We included the
proportion of firms in an industry that are known for
corporate philanthropy (generous and/or innovative giving)
as instruments because they are expected to be associated
with a firm’s philanthropic activities but are unlikely to
be associated with a firm’s financial performance (e.g.,
Galaskiewicz and Burt 1991, Wang et al. 2008, Wang and
Qian 2011). The inverse Mills’ ratio is then calculated
from this first-stage probit estimation. We then reestimated
all of our regression specifications including the inverse
Mills’ ratio. We continue to find evidence consistent
with our main tests reported earlier with one exception:
generous giving is no longer associated with firm value
(i.e., H1 is no longer supported). In a second and more
complex specification, we treat both Generous Giving and
Innovative Giving as two separate endogenous variables,
each with its own first stage to calculate inverse Mill’s
ratios. Doing so yielded results that are consistent with
our simpler Heckman specification. As predicted, this
evidence highlights that the critical distinction between
innovative and generous giving and stakeholders’ per-
ceptions of whether the philanthropic activities of a firm
are more symbolic or substantial do matter. It also offers
stronger support for H3.
Our empirical specification to test H4 follows the most
commonly used approach of only interacting the Sin
Firm variable with the variables of theoretical interest,
namely, Generous Giving and Innovative Giving. One
potential concern of such specification relates to a potential
correlated omitted variable problem introduced by not
including interaction terms between the Sin Firm variable
and control variables. We performed two robustness
checks to alleviate concerns that our main findings may be
an artifact of such omissions. First, we included additional
interaction terms between the Sin Firm variable and BVE
and EARN. Second, we separately estimated our model
using two subsamples based on whether a firm operates
in sin industries. Both sets of additional tests yielded
evidence consistent with H4.
Finally, our theoretically motivated empirical model
includes two summary measures of firms’ financial per-
formance and positions (EARN and BVE, respectively),
where the EARN measure includes both R&D expenditure
and advertising expense. Because theoretically, we are
not interested in how specific financial characteristics
influence firm value, we did not decompose these two
summary measures into their finer components. How-
ever, when examining the relationship between corporate
social and financial performance, extant ad hoc model
specifications typically control for these two factors sep-
arately (e.g., McWilliams and Siegel 2000). Therefore,
as robustness checks, we conducted additional analyses
that separately control for both R&D expenditure and
advertising expenditure, which yielded evidence consistent
with our main results. In addition, we separately controlled
for firm size by using two separate measures. Our results
remained robust when using the firm’s total assets and the
number of employees as proxies for firm size. Overall,
our supplementary analyses showed that our findings are
robust.
Discussion
The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship
between corporate philanthropy and firm value while
incorporating heterogeneity in the way firms give and
the characteristics of the philanthropic firms. Our empiri-
cal evidence suggests that incorporating these factors is
important for enriching our understanding of the finan-
cial impact of corporate philanthropy. We found that
although innovative and generous corporate philanthropy
are positively associated with firm value, this positive
association is stronger for innovative giving. Moreover, the
gap between the value effects of innovative and generous
giving is greater for sin firms and firms that are in the
Mature stage. In sum, our findings suggest that stake-
holders value philanthropic giving in both quantitative
and qualitative terms but that the qualitative aspect of
philanthropic activities appears to be more salient because
it is valued more positively and more consistently. In
addition, our findings highlight that it is not solely the
philanthropic actions that a firm undertakes that matter
but also the characteristics of the firm that undertakes
such actions.
This study and its findings have several important
implications for both academic research and practice. First,
the corporate philanthropy literature is characterized by
both a long-running debate and mixed empirical evidence
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on the relationship between corporate philanthropy and
firm performance. On a broader level, the results of this
study help resolve the debate and the mixed findings
(e.g., Friedman 1970, Godfrey 2005, Orlitzky et al. 2003,
Waddock and Graves 1997). More specifically, the existing
corporate philanthropy literature has largely focused on the
impact of the magnitude of corporate charitable donations
(i.e., the quantitative aspects) but has overlooked the
nature of these activities (i.e., the qualitative aspects)
and the factors that differentiate the firms pursuing such
activities. In this paper, we address this critical omission
by showing that the nature of corporate philanthropic
activities and the characteristics of the firms engaging in
these activities do indeed affect the value created through
corporate philanthropy.
Second, we contribute to the literature on symbolic
management by incorporating the role of stakeholder
perceptions when determining whether actions are sym-
bolic and substantive. Most previous studies have mainly
focused on firm actions in terms of whether the firm
actually engages in symbolic and substantive actions.
However, the literature has underplayed the role of stake-
holder perceptions of the actors who pursue the actions.
In this study, we fill this gap by showing that firm actions
alone may not be sufficient for determining their substan-
tativeness and that stakeholder perceptions of such actions,
which are influenced by firm features such as the type of
products or services that a firm provide and the life-cycle
stage of the firm, also matter. In addition, most studies
in the symbolic management literature have focused on
how and under which conditions firms use symbolic
and/or substantive actions (e.g., Westphal and Zajac 1994,
McDonnell et al. 2011). However, far less attention has
been paid to the performance implications of pursuing
symbolic and/or substantive actions in general and how
the value implications of symbolic and substantive might
differ. In this study, we fill this gap by contrasting the
value implications of philanthropic activities; our evidence
suggests that the value created by actions that we expect
to be perceived as being symbolic and substantive actions
do differ significantly.
Several important practical implications on the practice
of corporate philanthropy follow from our findings. The
results suggest that although it generally pays for firms to
engage in corporate philanthropy, managers must keep in
mind that not all corporate philanthropy is valued equally.
For corporate charitable acts to garner positive moral
capital consistently and to add firm value, firms need
to demonstrate their sincerity rather than be considered
acts of ingratiation. Otherwise, skeptical stakeholders
discount their efforts, which will reduce the potential
benefits of corporate philanthropy in terms of firm value.
In other words, being known merely as a giver limits the
potential for corporate philanthropic programs to add firm
value. Instead, being known for doing good with genuine
motives is what is required for charitable acts to be truly
value enhancing. Our results suggest that one avenue to
credibility can be to focus on philanthropic programs that
emphasize the qualitative aspects of their giving effort.
Facing the delicate acts of balancing economic and
social responsibility, managers can rest assured that they
can in fact “do good and do well” at the same time. They
can best achieve this by ensuring that they are able to
establish the genuineness of their charitable acts and
convey that to their stakeholders. They need to ensure
that their philanthropic activities are not tempered by self-
interest. When managers are able to do that, stakeholders
will be more likely to appreciate their charitable efforts,
and positive moral capital is more likely to ensue. We
have shown that even sin firms can establish credibility
in their corporate philanthropy and that if they do so,
stakeholders will value their efforts and not discount them
purely because of the nature of the firms’ business. That
is, even sinful firms, if they are genuine in their corporate
philanthropic activities, can do good for society and be
recognized for their efforts.
The issue, then, is not so much whether corporate
philanthropy adds value per se; rather, it is more about
how firms can engage in charitable acts such that they
add value in the presence of a firm’s resource constraints.
The results of this study can serve as an important step
toward a better understanding of not only the relationship
between corporate philanthropy and firm value but also the
importance of projecting sincerity in this value enhance-
ment process. This has been an important missing piece
in most prior empirical studies on corporate philanthropy.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
A number of suggestions for future research stem from
this study’s limitations. First, although this has been the
first known large sample study to examine the impact of
qualitative differences in the nature of philanthropic activ-
ities on the relationship between corporate philanthropy
and firm value, it has focused on only one additional way
(on top of the amount of giving) to differentiate between
different philanthropic activities, i.e., whether they are
innovative. Future research might fruitfully explore other
qualitative differences in giving, which might matter in
terms of explaining firm value. For example, giving might
qualitatively differ in terms of geographic focus (e.g.,
Tilcsik and Marquis 2013). Hence, future research could
investigate how the geographic aspect of giving might
influence stakeholders’ perception and, thus, firms’ value.
Another potential area of future exploration is associated
with our moderators. We focus on two key factors that may
act as information cues in stakeholders’ evaluation of the
firm’s sincerity in giving, i.e., the nature of the products or
services that a firm provides and the life-cycle stages of a
firm. Future research can investigate other characteristics
of the firm that influence how different types of giving
are perceived. In addition to sinful products/services, for
example, whether the firm has engaged in unethical or
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illegal behavior may be considered alternative cues for
stakeholders to evaluate a firm’s moral character. Another
fruitful area for future research is to examine firms’ moral
character more directly. For example, some recent work
has highlighted the promise inherent in the concepts of
authenticity and integrity for enhancing our understanding
of firm corporate social activities (e.g., Freeman and
Auster 2011, Liedtka 2008, Simons 2002). Future studies
may build on this literature to provide a more in-depth
understanding of how firms’ moral character and the
alignment (or misalignment) of their character with their
social activities affects firm value.
Second, we used the KLD ratings on whether firms
engages in innovative giving because it is currently the
best available and most widely used source of large
sample data on corporate social performance. However,
this nonetheless represents the assessments of one rating
agency. Future studies may revisit and expand some of
the issues that we investigate when other reliable data
become available. Another limitation of using third-party
ratings such as those by KLD is that they ignore the actual
projects in which firms engage. Another avenue for future
research might be to examine more closely the actual
charitable projects firms support. Closer examination of
the nature of those projects may give researchers a better
understanding of how firms actually portray their motives
to stakeholders, particularly in circumstances where stake-
holder skepticism may be difficult to overcome. A good
example can be found in a recent study by McShane and
Cunningham (2012). Through in-depth interviews with
employees, their study provided a detailed account of
the nature of firm CSR programs and how employees
differentiate between authentic and inauthentic programs.
Along these lines, future research can investigate whether
participating in projects initiated by the firms themselves
or run by other charitable organizations convey different
messages to stakeholders. This may limit the use of a
large sample archival research methodology such as that
adopted in this study.
Third, our arguments rely on implicit assumptions about
how stakeholders perceive corporate philanthropy under
different conditions. Although there are many challenges
to observing stakeholders’ perceptions more directly in
large quantitative studies such as ours, future research
could use different empirical approaches to measure
more directly how stakeholders perceive the quantitative
and qualitative aspect of firms’ philanthropy programs.
Moreover, we discuss the perceptions and responses of
various firm stakeholders such as employees, customers,
and communities and largely consider “stakeholders” to
be a homogenous group in developing the key arguments.
However, it is clearly the case that some stakeholders may
have a greater impact on firm value than others. Although
it is beyond the scope of the current study, understanding
the variation across different stakeholder groups in their
perceptions of corporate philanthropy and the impacts of
such different perceptions on firm value is an interesting
subject in itself. Such an approach would be especially
valuable for future studies examining specific outcome
variables (e.g., employee satisfaction or customer loyalty)
that are relevant for one particular group of stakeholders
(employees or customers).
Moreover, in this study, we focus on one important
aspect of a firms’ CSR behavior, namely, corporate phi-
lanthropy. We believe that our arguments and findings
are extendable to firms’ other CSR behavior such as
environmental performance. Further research could inves-
tigate how the quantitative and qualitative aspects of
other dimensions of CSR behavior influence stakeholder
perceptions and firm value.
Finally, future research might investigate whether stake-
holders use the success or failure of previous philanthropic
activities as a signal when determining whether to extend
goodwill to firms. For example, it is conceivable that
stakeholders may not view a firm that has consistently
been involved in charitable projects that failed to achieve
their stated objectives favorably. Such firms are likely to
accrue only very limited positive moral capital among
stakeholders despite firms’ good intentions in taking part
in these charitable acts. Stakeholders may consider such
failures to be a sign of consistently poor management
decisions that may permeate to other aspects of the firm’s
operations. In the extreme, ill will might ensue. A lon-
gitudinal research methodology that tracks the progress
of charitable projects across time seems well suited to
addressing research questions of this nature.
Conclusions
Corporate philanthropy can be valuable for firms, but
its value depends on stakeholders’ inferences about the
sincerity of a firm’s charitable acts. Firms can credibly
signal their sincerity by focusing their philanthropy on
programs that are generous and/or innovative. However,
the benefits of innovative giving are generally greater
than those of generous giving and are less likely to be
discounted, even for firms that provide sinful products and
firms that are in a certain life-cycle stages. Hence, just
doing good or being generous may have a limited impact
on building a durable appreciation among stakeholders.
Instead, firms can make a substantially bigger impact by
focusing on the qualitative aspects when designing their
philanthropy programs. We hope that by taking the first
step toward incorporating the roles of firms’ sincerity in
corporate philanthropy and stakeholder inference of firm
intentions, this study can spur a lively debate and research
agenda on their roles in advancing our understanding
of the relationship between firm value and corporate
philanthropy.
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Endnotes
1The paper examines how employees differentiate between
authentic and inauthentic CSR programs, and how these judg-
ments influence their perceptions of the organization. They find
that perceived authenticity can lead to positive outcomes such
as organizational identification and employee connections.
2One of the two items that we use is labeled differently in
the KLD data. The item that corresponds to our concept of
“generous giving” is labeled “charitable giving” in the KLD data.
To avoid confusion, we consistently use the terms “generous
giving” and “innovative giving” throughout the entire paper.
3We believe this is a substantial amount, considering that the
population of Compustat firms over the 1990–2009 period spent,
on average, 3.0% and 4.5% of their earnings before taxes on
R&D and advertising, respectively.
4The KLD data consultant also noted that after 2009, the
variable that we label “innovative giving” starts to include a
wider range of initiatives than do those aimed at promoting
“self-sufficiency.” However, this is beyond the 19-year period
of our sample, which ends in 2009, and should thus not pose
any problems. The full correspondence with the MSCI data
consultant is available from the authors upon request.
5See Dickinson (2011) for detailed explanations of the clas-
sification scheme. In a nutshell, it can be summarized as
follows:
Sign of 1 2 3 4
Cash flows from: Introduction Growth Mature Shakeout
Operating activities − + + −
Investing activities − − − −
Financing activities + + − −
Sign of 5 6 7 8
Cash flows from: Shakeout Shakeout Decline Decline
Operating activities + + − −
Investing activities + + + +
Financing activities + − + −
6Our results are robust to only using firms in the Growth,
Mature, and Shakeout stages, as classified by Dickinson’s
scheme (i.e., excluding firms in the introduction and decline
stages), where we continue to find evidence consistent with the
results reported in Table 2.
7We adopt the Fama-French 49 industry classification, which
is commonly used in the accounting and finance literature,
as our industry controls. This scheme classifies firms into 49
industry groups based on their four-digit SIC codes. A full
list of the classification can be accessed on Kenneth French’s
website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
Data_Library/det_49_ind_port.html).
8We conducted Hausman tests to select between fixed- and
random-effects specifications. These tests showed that the
random-effects estimator was inconsistent; thus, fixed effects
are preferred.
9If one is interested in the effect of a specific financial charac-
teristic on firm value, one can simply include that particular
variable of interest separately in the estimation equation and
exclude it from either the BVE or EARN variables as appropriate.
Otherwise, there is no need to decompose it from either the
BVE or EARN variables.
10More specifically, our sample contains 632 observations in
which the firm engages in generous giving, 548 observations in
which the firm engages in innovative giving, and 158 observa-
tions in which the firm engages in both generous and innovative
giving.
11The three life-cycle stages are mutually exclusive, and we used
the Mature stage as the base category in our analysis. To test
whether the value of engaging in Generous Giving is significantly
lower than that of engaging in Innovative Giving in the Mature
stage (i.e., the base category), we compare the coefficient of
Generous Giving with that of Innovative Giving using an F -test.
For the Growth and Shakeout stages, we also use F -tests to
contrast the overall effects of Generous Giving versus Innovative
Giving within each stage. Specifically, for the Growth stage, we
compare (Generous Giving + Growth × Generous Giving) with
(Innovative Giving + Growth × Innovative Giving); analogously,
we compare (Generous Giving + Shakeout × Generous Giving)
with (Innovative Giving + Shakeout × Innovative Giving) to
test for the effects within the Shakeout stage. As an alternative
approach, we also compared the coefficients using three sub-
samples based on the life-cycle stage, which yielded consistent
results.
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